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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS REGARDING THE
NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE request of the editors of the REVIEW that I should give a short account of my fundamental conceptions regarding the nature of consciousness, affords me an opportunity of addressing myself to the readers of this magazine, who have read the acute criticisms of Dr. Warner Fite,¹ and of making them more accurately acquainted with the philosophical basis of my psychology. Psychology, as the fundamental 'science of mind,' cannot, any more than the science of the given or of being as such, avoid the question regarding the nature of consciousness; and on this account it is more closely related than the natural sciences to philosophy as the universal science. It is true that this problem, which has in our time become more and more the centre of philosophical interest, is to all appearance a new one in form alone, and in content is identical with the inquiry into 'mind,' which was previously the principal philosophical problem. But the fact that old problems appear in new guise, in every case signifies more than a mere change in the external aspect of the problem. It invariably shows in addition that an advance has been made in the comprehension of the question, and, as a result of this, that the problem is approached in a better way and treated with an increasing prospect of success.

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, July, 1896, and March, 1897.

Both questions—What is mind? and, What is consciousness?—spring from the same source. It is the same datum which has given rise to the use of the terms ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness.’ But it is no accidental circumstance that the latter word is, relatively speaking, of recent origin, and has not been in literary use more than two hundred years, while the word ‘mind’ comes down from the earliest times. And, moreover, it is not by chance that the term ‘consciousness’ has only in the most recent times come to designate an individual, and not, as formerly, a characteristic of particular individuals. It is here that the necessary advance in the development of our knowledge shows itself.

In order to obtain a clear conception of the nature of that datum which was formerly called ‘mind,’—and is now more frequently and, as it is thought, more aptly, designated by the term ‘consciousness,’—it is important to bear in mind continually the two different meanings which ‘consciousness’ now has, so that when the word is used we may be certain of the exact meaning it is meant to convey in the particular case. The investigation of this datum itself will then yield the result that our development, which begins with the use of ‘consciousness’ as a term indicative of a *determination* of an individual, must necessarily end with the use of ‘consciousness’ as a term referring to a special kind of *individual*, while the first signification does not necessarily fall into disuse. Thus one says at first merely, “An individual *has* consciousness,” but afterwards one says also, “An individual *is* consciousness.”

Before we enter more deeply into this discussion it will be necessary to reach some common ground or starting-point which is generally admitted, for without this an understanding in this matter can scarcely be looked for. That which is always the given for us, and hence is capable of being the object of scientific investigation, appears either as *individual* or as *determination* of individuals; in other words, either as a mere ‘this’ (*Einzelnes*) or as *universal*. Under these two concepts the given as such can without question be completely included. It is obvious that this division is logical and not real; when we use it we

do not in any sense divide the given into two groups which can be presented in isolation, as one can divide a flock into sheep and goats. For what, as given, is determination or universal is never given except in and with an individual; and what, on the other hand, is individual or particular is never given without the universal as its determination. Thus an individual without determination or universal is as little possible or conceivable as a universal without an individual. It is true that one can view the universal or the determination of the individual under a special aspect, regard it 'for itself.' One thereby abstracts from everything which the given as individual offers in addition, and on this account is justified in calling the determination 'abstract.' But the individual itself cannot be regarded apart from its determination, for it is only in virtue of the latter that it is given as this individual and no other.

From the usage of language there arises a great temptation to speak of the individual as 'particular,' in opposition to the determination which is termed 'universal.' Thereby, as it seems to me, the logical opposition of these two species of the given is not clearly brought to light; nay, it can even in this way be easily obliterated. 'Particular' (*Besonderes*) means that which is separated from everything else (*Gesonderte*). The 'particular' is, in consequence, not merely the single individual. Every determination is also particular without losing its claim to be regarded as a 'universal.'¹ Every determination is in fact 'particular' not only in opposition to everything that is individual, but also in opposition to every other determination in the given as such. And if one could interpret 'particular' to mean that which can be given *for itself alone*, the individual would have as little claim to this title as the determination. For it is only to outward seeming that an individual is given 'for itself alone'; if we would look at the matter in the proper light we should find that no individual is given without something else, without an 'environment.' However much concentrated attention may isolate the individual from its environment, so that it appears as a particular in the sense

¹ Cf. p. 453.

of something that is given 'for itself alone,' the individual is nevertheless present along with its environment, consequently along with other particulars, *i.e.*, with other things separated off from it.

If one chooses a term for the individual merely to express its logical opposition to its determination so far as the latter is universal, one must describe the individual as a mere 'this' (*Einzelnes*). For to call the individual in a sense the *unity* of several determinations, does not help us to gain a clear logical distinction between it and the determination, or universal, since most determinations themselves appear as unities of several determinations. Compare, for instance, 'this rose-individual' with 'rose,' as determination of this individual.

When we speak of the individual as a 'this, and the determination as universal, this distinction will only become perfectly clear and certain when we make explicit what is tacitly presupposed, and expressly add "in the given." If this addition be not made, one could object that every determination is also a 'this' as much as every individual. We must recognize the force of this objection if it is advanced under the implied qualification, which we add, "from the point of view of logic." Only in this form is it a valid objection, and the difficulty disappears when we expressly say, "In the given the individual appears merely as a 'this.'" In opposition to this particular individual, then, we call the determination a *universal*, for, while the particular individual is given *only once* in experience, *i.e.*, as a mere 'this,' the determination as this particular determination is, or at all events can be, given in connection with a larger or smaller number of individuals at the same time or in succession, and hence is common to all these individuals (*allen gemein*).

If we examine more closely the given, so far as it is individual, we find that it may be brought under two separate concepts, for in the given we meet the individual as *unchangeable* or as *changeable*. A changeable individual is a thing, *e.g.*, 'this rose,' 'this tree,' 'this stone'; an unchangeable individual is, for instance, a separate moment of 'this tree,' etc. The investi-

gation of the thing leads us to conclude that it is a unity of unchangeable individuals which follow one another in unbroken succession, and are distinguished from one another solely through the particularity (*Besonderheit*) of their determination. On the other hand, in the *universal* these determinations are absolutely identical. This continuous succession of individuals in themselves unchangeable, comes to be regarded as a series of time-sections of the changeable individual, only through a subsequent logical examination of the 'thing,' which was already given in experience as a changeable individual. Accordingly, each one of these unchangeable individuals is first formed by abstraction, and we can therefore call these unchangeable individuals of the thing abstractions and momentary unities of the individual which changes.

If we again examine the given as such, we may say that, logically regarded, it falls on the one hand into the *abstract* (*i.e.*, the universal or determination), and the unchangeable or momentary individual; and, on the other hand, into the changeable individual, which we also call *concrete* for the purpose of embodying in a convenient expression the opposition to all that is abstract. The momentary parts of this concrete (which form a continuum constitutive of an unchangeable individual) differ from one another only in the particularity (*Besonderheit*) of their determinations. Hence its change consists only in the alternation of different modifications (*Besonderheiten*) of the determination. The thing which was green is now red; it has therefore altered in respect to its color. That is, the particularity of its determination, color, is different from the former one; is red instead of green. As regards the universal in its determination, however, its momentary unities are *identical*, for in all moments of its being the thing has 'color.' Since, therefore, we can only talk of a change in the given when there is an alternation in the modifications of its determination, it is clear that we cannot speak of a change, either of the determination itself or of the momentary individual; so that one is justified in declaring that everything that is abstract is unchangeable, and thus stands over against the concrete, *i.e.*, the changeable individual,

as its logical opposite. Of course we retain the ordinary forms of speech by which we talk of the color, quantity, motion, warmth, etc., as changing, but we add that these expressions are only abbreviated forms of the statement that '*the thing changes* in color, quantity, motion, and warmth.'

The particular datum which is designated by the term 'consciousness' when, for instance, we say that 'man has consciousness,' has evidently the character of a determination, and therefore of a universal. This is clearly brought out in the phrase 'we have consciousness,' for it is evident that 'consciousness' here means something that is common to us all. But 'to have consciousness' means the same as 'to be conscious of a thing, of something.' What this signifies can only be understood by one who 'has consciousness,' and such a being will understand what is meant without hesitation, and must understand, for there is no other concept to which this 'having consciousness' (*Bewusstseinhaben*) can be reduced, and all explanations that may be added already presuppose that the meaning of the phrase is understood. We 'have consciousness' when we sense or ideate. Each of these words designates a special way of 'having consciousness,' and the particular datum signified by the one differs from the datum indicated by the other just in the different particularity of the determination in each case.

Further, this determination, like every universal, can only be given in an individual. But before we come to an understanding on the nature of the individual which has consciousness as its determination, we must examine more closely the two examples already cited of different species of this determination, namely, sense and idea. 'To sense' and 'to ideate' mean the same as 'to have sensations,' and 'to have ideas,' but if we do not keep clearly in mind this identity in meaning, the belief easily creeps in that 'to have sensations,' and 'to have ideas,' do not indicate particular forms of 'having consciousness.' Consequently the impression arises that they are not divisions of the concept 'having consciousness,' and that 'sensation' and 'idea' do not designate particular forms of the universal determination, con-

consciousness; but that in the phrase 'to have sensations and ideas,' the 'have' by itself means already as much as 'to have consciousness'; and 'sensation' and 'idea' are of such a nature that when we 'have sensations and ideas,' consciousness has at last gained a new particular determination. Hence they come to be regarded as accidental determinations, whose presence is not essential. The last opinion is met with in those psychologists who speak of 'conscious' and 'unconscious' sensations and ideas. In this way, however, the whole conception of the determination, consciousness, is distorted, for the latter is made an accidental determination of sensations and ideas. We, on the contrary, regard these as particular determinations of the universal, consciousness. We here touch upon a fundamental contradiction in the psychology of to-day.

The question now arises whether or not the datum which we call sensation and idea is individual. Take for example the sensation of color, bright-red. Our question is: Is this sensation concrete, that is, is it a changeable individual? This must be answered in the negative, for if the sensation dark-red, for instance, appears in the next moment, we cannot with scientific exactitude say that bright-red has changed into dark-red. On the contrary we must rather affirm that dark-red is given as a particular sensation in place of bright-red. It is true that both are sensations of color and thus identical in their *universal* determination, color; but this identity, even under the added supposition of the *immediate* succession of the sensations, does not justify us in speaking of a change of bright-red into dark-red. And certainly no one would use this expression in a strictly scientific sense. Nevertheless many will continue to insist that the sensation is the individual, though an unchangeable individual. In our opinion, however, this contention can be easily overthrown. If any one imagines that the sensation bright-red which here and now makes its appearance, is yet unquestionably a mere 'this' (*Einzelnes*) which can only be given once, he tacitly assumes that the 'here' and the 'now' are determinations which belong to bright-red itself. But this is at variance with the facts of

experience and cannot be maintained. That it is given here and now in no wise belongs to the sensation bright-red as such ; hence for the latter and its particular nature time and space, though always present, are of no importance. This is a single but most effective consideration, which unfortunately is left out of account by the opposite side. If it is given due weight, it leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the given which we call 'sensation' cannot be regarded as an individual, since it can be given at the same time in different places and in one place at different times, and is thus a universal. Hence it cannot be looked upon as a 'this' (*Einzelnes*), *i.e.*, as something which can only be given once. What holds for sensation holds for ideation. The latter also is not an individual, either changeable or unchangeable ; it is on the contrary a universal, *i.e.*, a determination of an individual.

There is a prominent school of psychological thinkers which is guilty of overlooking this fundamental principle, and thus it happens that many psychologists, misled doubtless to some extent by an inaccurate terminology, regard sensation and idea as psychical individuals, and employ them in psychology in the same manner as atoms and molecules are used in natural science. The reluctance to assume a 'soul' as a particular individual, a reluctance for which David Hume is chiefly responsible, contributes to bring about the result that sensation and idea are treated as psychical individuals, even by those who would otherwise be willing to regard them as particular aspects of a more general determination. But however much we may respect Hume's acute investigations, we cannot admit that in the question regarding the soul he has given the right answer, and on this point has indicated the right standpoint for psychological inquiry. In saying this we do not deny that the psychologists who adopt the Humian standpoint and treat sensation and idea as if they were psychical individuals, can produce valuable scientific results in matters of detail. The facts declare strongly and unmistakably that they can. Psychological investigation is in this respect on the same footing as physical science, which has worked to advantage with

‘motion’ as if it were a concrete individual whose changes had to be determined. And yet in both cases that which has been the object of scientific research (sensation in the one case, motion in the other) is not in truth an individual, not even an abstract unchangeable individual, but in all cases solely and simply a universal, *i.e.*, a determination of an individual; and the so-called changes of sensation or of motion are as a matter of fact a series of various successive sensations or motions of an individual that changes.

What we seek to establish, therefore, in regard to sensation and idea is not opposed, as we have already said, to the scientific results of special investigations which were carried on under the assumption that sensation and idea were individuals. We can and do admit these results without hesitation. We are convinced, however, that the point of view here put forward with regard to sensation and idea in general can be united with the results in question, and must be taken as the general psychological position in place of the one inherited from Hume, which is not in harmony with the facts, since it regards as an individual that which really is a determination of an individual.

If sensation and idea are not really individuals, they must, if they are given at all, be determinations of an individual. But there still remains the question how that which is known to us as the determination, ‘consciousness,’ is logically related to these determinations. In other words, is consciousness a particular aspect (*Besonderheit*) or in some sense a determination (characteristic) belonging to sensation; or, on the contrary, is sensation, etc., a special determination, a particular aspect of consciousness. If consciousness were a special aspect of sensation, besides ‘conscious’ sensation there would also be given sensation of another sort which would not have the determination consciousness, and accordingly ought to be called ‘unconscious’ sensation. Many psychologists, of course, will adopt the same logical standpoint as we do, and emphatically deny the existence of unconscious sensation; from the others, who cling to this conception of the unconscious, we must demand that unconscious sensation be characterized in such a way that

we have before us, in that peculiar positive particularity (*Besonderheit*) which alone can give meaning and scientific justification to the negative title 'unconscious,' that which is not itself given. They cannot, however, meet the demand, for one cannot imagine what sort of a particular character (*Besonderheit*) the sensation which is not conscious should possess in opposition to the sensation characterized by the alleged particular character, consciousness. Without this positive particularity the 'unconscious' sensation could not exist as another particular sensation alongside of the sensation that we know (*i.e.*, the conscious sensation). The merely negative term 'unconscious,' apart from the positive background, tells us absolutely nothing. To maintain that the particular character of this alleged sensation is found in the fact that it does *not* have consciousness, does not extricate one from the difficulty, but makes the entanglement worse. For now the question immediately arises : What is a sensation from which consciousness is lacking? It must in some way be characterized for us, in opposition to conscious sensation, through something positive, in order that we can comprehend it as something definite. Those who introduce the word 'unconscious' into psychology do not consider this, and they attach the term to such concepts as sensation and idea, which are given us immediately only in consciousness. They are not aware that they merely affix an empty word to those conceptions, without thereby, as a matter of fact, separating or being able to separate, even for their own comprehension, the concepts sensation and idea, etc., from the concept 'consciousness.'

We recognize the fact that those philosophers who, in opposition to logic and fact alike, find consciousness only a particular aspect of determinations, must cling to the fiction of unconscious sensations and perceptions, since without this contradictory opposition they cannot rationally maintain their view of consciousness. The fact that they imagine to have gained more than a verbal opposition by the use of the word 'unconscious,' may be explained to a large extent by means of the custom already mentioned of regarding sensations and

ideas as individuals and treating them as things. For it seems very natural that sensations and ideas are given in the same way as things, that at one time they are conscious and at another time unconscious. The tree before me has the determination consciousness, *i.e.*, is for me a conscious fact, when it is present to me in sensation or idea ; and again does not have this determination, *i.e.*, is not for me a conscious fact, when it is not so present. In the same way, these psychologists imagine, sensation, etc., may be conscious or unconscious. Hence they think themselves justified in talking of 'conscious' and 'unconscious' sensation. Whoever, then, bears in mind the fact that the given sensation, etc., is not individual but universal, and yet maintains that consciousness is a particular aspect of sensation, clings nevertheless to the analogy of the 'thing.' He reasons as follows : as the universal of a thing, *e.g.*, weight, color, etc., can be both 'conscious' and 'unconscious,' so can these two attributes be ascribed to sensation as possible particular aspects of it.

To dispel the illusion in which many psychologists of to-day rest, it seems to me sufficient to press the question what meaning can really be attached to an unconscious sensation, as something which is given in general (*als Gegebenes überhaupt*). In other words, we must ask what a sensation is, when we leave out of account the fact that it is present in my consciousness or in that of some other individual. What is left of the sensation 'red,' for example, under such circumstances? We cannot fall back on the assumed analogy with the 'thing,' for at this stage it is only possible and permissible to deal with that which is itself under examination. We must say therefore that nothing is left when consciousness is taken away from sensation. But "Stop!" we hear some of our opponents exclaim, who, grasping hopefully at the straw which still remains, declare that unconscious sensation and idea are physiological states of the brain. But this explanation is also a vain labor of love, for a (conscious) sensation 'red' is not in any sense itself a conscious brain state ; and if it were, if the sensation 'red' and a conscious brain state were identi-

cal, our opponents would still find themselves confronted with a dilemma. For *either* one and the same datum is, as conscious, a sensation of red, as unconscious, a brain state, — in which case one could no longer talk of ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ sensations of red, but only, and that pleonastically, of ‘conscious’ sensation, — *or*, if it is still possible to speak of ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ sensation of red, and the ‘unconscious’ means a brain state, it must be assumed that this brain state can possess the determination consciousness in a twofold manner, can as conscious be present in a twofold manner, as sensation of red and at the same time also as gray brain matter which must be identical with the sensation itself. We see ourselves here involved in a hopeless maze of contradiction and confusion, and the conviction must now force itself upon us that it is contrary to facts and to reason alike, to explain consciousness as a particular aspect of sensation, idea, etc., and in consequence to maintain the existence of ‘unconscious’ sensation, etc.

Although we cannot, without falling into the grossest contradiction, regard consciousness as a particular aspect of that universal which we know as sensation, idea, etc., still the view is not at the same time excluded that it is itself a determination or characteristic of sensation, idea, etc., and that in consequence ‘conscious sensation’ is in every respect a pleonastic expression for sensation pure and simple. Indeed this is the very opinion which those would maintain who cannot regard reason as under the influence of the psychical unconscious; they take their stand on the principle that whenever sensation, idea, feeling, etc., is present, consciousness is there, *i.e.*, something of which we are conscious. This brings us back to our previous contention that ‘to have sensation’ is not the same as ‘to have consciousness of sensation,’ if this be interpreted to mean that ‘having consciousness’ is something added for the first time to sensation as a new determination; as, for instance, in the case of ‘having consciousness of being operated on.’ It must rather be taken to imply ‘having a particular kind of consciousness.’ If, therefore, consciousness is once taken in the sense of a universal

determination, sensation and idea, or what is now obviously the same thing, 'to sense' and 'to ideate,' cannot be otherwise regarded than as a particular mode of this universal determination, *i.e.*, as a *particular form of consciousness*.

This is, therefore, the first result of our investigation, that consciousness in the sense of a *determination* cannot be a particular form of a general determination, but can truly be only a *universal determination*; consequently, that all phenomena or facts of consciousness are not in any sense consciousness as a particularity, but rather are themselves the particular forms of consciousness. Consciousness is thus the general concept, while sensation, idea, feeling, etc., are its subdivisions.

Still the problem of the nature of consciousness is not thereby completely solved. Sensation, idea, etc., as we have shown, cannot be other than determinations, consequently are as universals opposed to the individual or the 'this' (*Einzelnes*), and consciousness, whose subdivisions they constitute, must likewise be universal. It is therefore indispensable for us to determine the nature of the individual whose determination is consciousness, and therefore to seek the individual which has that conscious something which we know as sensation, idea, etc., or which, to put it briefly, 'has consciousness.'

At the outset we here call attention once more to our general presupposition that the given which we investigate is a world of particular concrete existences. Hence that which after our investigation appears in this world of ours as particular (whether it be as momentary individual, or momentary unity of concrete things) must gain this character for us through our abstracting thought, and therefore can be rightly termed 'abstract' in opposition to the underlying concrete. Hence, if we are to understand it as given, we must recognize what appears in this world as abstract in its relation of dependence on a concrete, and accordingly seek to establish it as a determination of the concrete individual to which it belongs. This is the case also with consciousness regarded as a universal determination whose particulars are sensation, idea, feeling, etc. If we could not find an individual whose determination

this consciousness is, the datum which we would express by the word 'consciousness' would be, in its character as a given, wholly incomprehensible. Now nothing seems easier than to find such an individual. Man has consciousness; more specifically he has sensation, idea, feeling, etc. He is therefore the individual of whom we are in search. This whole question seems thereby settled, for it is no concern of ours to consider what other kinds of individuals there may be who also possess this determination.

Taking for granted then that consciousness is a determination of man, it must certainly — and all will agree on this point — be a *particular* determination alongside of that which we express by the word 'body,' or by the phrase 'corporeal determination.' The materialistic conception as such, according to which consciousness is a determination of the individual's human body, may be regarded as untenable, and may therefore be left out of account. So far as sensation, idea, etc., signify, for the individual who has consciousness, a particular form of this consciousness, we can, as we have shown, call this consciousness the universal determination of individuals, and sensation and idea can be named in opposition to it particular determinations. But then we must demand apparently that the conscious individual we are in search of, if it does not at all times manifest every single one of these particular determinations, must still in every moment have one of these, since consciousness is its universal determination. But, supposing that man is the individual in question, can we maintain that this is always the case with him? Does man always have consciousness? Experience and the record of experience preserved in language render an affirmative answer to this question impossible. The phrases 'he lost consciousness,' 'he was without consciousness,' 'he regained consciousness' are in common use; and apparently express an indubitable fact. We say, 'consciousness is not always present, it disappears, and comes back again'; and despite this the individual, whose determination has just been asserted to be consciousness, apparently continues to exist. How shall we extricate ourselves from this contradiction?

In accordance with the usage of language, 'man' here evidently signifies a separate concrete or changeable individual, and it is implied that just as there is an alternation in the particular conscious determinations, so there is an alternation in the particular bodily determinations. But at every moment of man's existence body as determination is present. If the temporal succession of bodily determinations did not form a continuous but an interrupted sequence, we could not talk of *one* individual as the possessor of these determinations; the being of a concrete individual possessing corporeal determination must in this respect form a continuum of particular bodily momentary unities, which we here call the particular momentary individuals of the 'body.' The abstract momentary unities of the changing individual are *identical in the universal* determination, and differ only in *particular forms of this determination*. Every change of an individual in the given as such, shows this identity and this difference of his particular abstract momentary unities. It is easy at this point to overlook the fact that the *identity in the universal determination*, which the various abstract momentary unities of a concrete individual exhibit, is an important and absolutely indispensable moment, if we are to speak with full justification of a concrete individual. If this identity were absent even in the case of one of the different momentary unities, we could not, despite their temporal continuity, group the latter together and regard them as constituting one thing.

We leave this point for the most part out of account if we attempt to understand consciousness as a determination of 'man,' and think ourselves able despite everything to hold fast to the individual 'man' and to consciousness as one of his determinations, even when the individual shows momentary aspects in which the determination 'consciousness' does not appear. We imagine thereby a concrete 'man' of whom a particular change consists in this, that the determination consciousness is wanting at one moment, while at a former time in his existence it was present. Consciousness would not in that case be a universal determination of man, and it must logically be regarded as a *particular mode* of some

universal determination of man, which must be imagined to alternate with another particular mode of the universal determination if, as we are accustomed to say, 'man is without consciousness.' But this brings back the difficulty already mentioned in aggravated form, the difficulty of pointing out in the individual the universal determination of which consciousness is a particular mode. And the second difficulty also appears, that of finding out the other mode of the required universal determination which alternates with the alleged particular mode, consciousness. The first difficulty must speedily lead to the admission that a universal determination of which consciousness could be the particular mode cannot be discovered. The second difficulty some believe they can overcome by the assertion that what takes the place of consciousness is simply unconsciousness, *i.e.*, the *lack*, the *absence*, the *not-being* of consciousness. But, unfortunately, in irreconcilable opposition to this stands the fact *that not-being can never appear in place of a determination of the individual*. This is an axiomatic fundamental principle with which all thinking and knowledge of the concrete given stands or falls. Hence the assertion that in the human individual the unconscious (not-consciousness) can alternate with consciousness, has absolutely no meaning. It is a mere play upon words which may perhaps conceal the difficulty from purblind eyes, but in fact leaves it just where it was before. Since it is impossible, therefore, to discover anything positive which, on the supposition that consciousness is only a particular aspect of an unknown determination of individuals, could be imagined to exist in the individual as the other particular mode which must take the place of the former when it is absent, the second difficulty must also extort the frank admission that, since the absolutely indispensable particular mode cannot be found, consciousness is obviously not the particular aspect of some universal determination, but must itself be a universal determination. This, it seems to us, is the indubitable result of the inquiry we have just completed. Since consciousness as determination is a universal determination of the individual, we can understand why it should be labor lost to

regard it as a particular mode of a universal determination, and to place another mode alongside of it in order to explain the fact that 'man loses consciousness.'

If now, on the one hand, consciousness as determination can be only a universal determination of an individual, and if, on the other hand, there is nevertheless meaning in the expressions, 'man has a body and has consciousness,' 'man loses consciousness,' we on our side, in order to uphold both, must seek another solution. Since the 'man' who loses consciousness does not therefore possess this as his universal determination, and hence cannot be the individual which the universal determination consciousness necessarily requires, we cannot regard the given which we call 'man' as a single individual, but rather as a peculiar conjunction (*Zusammen*) of two individuals, as a conjunction of two concrete individuals, one of whom possesses consciousness as its universal determination. We do not have far to seek for the other individual which, along with the conscious individual, constitutes the given we call 'man'; it is the human body. That conjunction to which the name 'man' is attached is not, however, an indissoluble one. If it were, consciousness could without any difficulty be termed the universal determination of man. But in that case, again, we could not use the expression, 'man loses consciousness.' If, to justify this expression, we regard the conjunction of corporeal with conscious individual as a separable one, we can give an intelligible meaning to the two forms of speech, 'man has body and has consciousness,' 'man loses consciousness and regains it.' In the one case 'man' is characterized as a combination of two entirely different individuals; in the other, on the contrary, what we say is that this particular combination at a given moment no longer exists, and then again exists. It is true that in the statement, 'man loses consciousness and regains it,' there is a suggestion of the materialism which sees in body the true being of man, and hence is inclined to regard man himself as a single individual, and not as the peculiar conjunction of two absolutely disparate individuals. This, however, can only commend itself to those who forget the axiomatic truth that, *if the individual*

itself is to continue to exist, in place of the determination of an individual the absolute non-being of this determination cannot be substituted. The succeeding determination must always be one which, at bottom identical with the former, differs from it only in a particular aspect.

If this truth be forgotten, and consciousness be regarded in consequence as a peculiar determination of the individual 'man' (not of course as an essential and permanent, but as an accidental determination, *i.e.*, one that now exists in the individual and at another time does not), then as a matter of fact the human body will be taken for the true individual which the term 'man' denotes, and consciousness will be regarded as simply a determination of the individual which the latter at one time possesses and again does not. To fall into this shame-faced materialism is inevitable for those who transgress against the principle that change in an individual is always merely a change in the particularity of his universal determination, but never an alternation of being and non-being of a determination. It is true that we can, in harmony with the facts of experience, speak of the alternation of being and non-being in the individual, but we can never use this language in reference to the alternations of a determination. In the latter case the alternation is an impossibility, but in the former it is not a change in the individual, but rather a coming into existence and a ceasing to be on the part of the individual.

But since consciousness as determination can alone be the universal determination of an individual, man, who 'loses consciousness,' as we popularly express it, cannot be the individual we are in search of as the bearer of consciousness. We must therefore seek elsewhere for this particular individual whose determination consciousness is. But since man 'has consciousness,' as the saying goes, and since the human body as such alone corresponds fully to the conception of a particular individual, we can harmonize these two facts only by regarding man as a peculiar conjunction of two particular individuals, namely body and that individual which has consciousness as its universal determination. In obedience to the facts there

fore, we interpret the statement 'man has consciousness' to mean that to man belongs a body and also another particular individual which exhibits consciousness as its universal determination. But this expression, rightly understood, can only be taken to mean that the particular individual which belongs to man and has consciousness as its universal determination, *is not* present at the moment; whence it follows that at this moment man also is no longer in existence, but only the human body. We say, it is true, that 'the man lost consciousness,' though strictly speaking this is correct only with reference to the individual whose universal determination is consciousness. The man as the conjunction of that individual and the permanent body is obviously no longer in existence. If one nevertheless still uses the word 'man' in this expression, one must then to be logical mean the body, and hence believe that 'the body lost consciousness.' We must not, therefore, interpret this expression to mean that *the body itself* suffered alteration, and exchanged a mode of one of its universal determinations for another; but rather that the body lost that individual which constituted 'man' in conjunction with itself, and thereby as a matter of course was no longer accompanied by consciousness, which is the universal determination of the latter.

This individual whose universal determination must be consciousness, obviously cannot be a second body, or any other 'thing,' *i.e.*, corporeal individual. We cannot conceive an individual to be given without that which is its universal determination, and there is no doubt that body or thing as such is given as an individual without the determination consciousness. Since we find in the given no other universal determination than corporeality and consciousness, and the former is the one universal determination of the thing, the latter remains as the universal determination of that other individual belonging to man of which we are in search. This we can call the 'consciousness-individual,' for consciousness is its sole universal determination. The objection may be urged that it is possible to conceive an individual which has corporeality as its universal determination, and yet at the same time possesses conscious-

ness as its universal determination. But even if an individual could be proved to exist which exhibited corporeality and consciousness as its two universal determinations, this would not affect the necessary assumption of a pure consciousness-individual in man alongside of the bare thing-individual. This assumption follows necessarily from the fact expressed in the statement, 'the man lost consciousness.' We should then have three species of individuals to distinguish: consciousness-individual, thing-individual, and that which is at the same time both consciousness- and thing-individual. We hold, it is true, that this third kind of individual is inconceivable and self-contradictory, but even if such a being could be conceived, it is an error to suppose that man is an individual of this sort, conceived after the Spinozistic pattern. This view is refuted by the fact that man loses consciousness, while his corporeal determination, *i.e.*, his body, is still present. For a more detailed treatment of this question regarding the consciousness-individual, Spinozism, and parallelism, I must refer to my *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie*.¹

Man is unquestionably not one individual but a peculiar conjunction of two individuals, a body and a consciousness-individual. The latter, whose sole determination is that it has consciousness, can therefore itself be called a consciousness, if we give the word 'consciousness' the signification which it now usually possesses. We can now say that what has consciousness must be an individual and indeed a consciousness; and, conversely, what is consciousness must have a universal determination, and this is consciousness.

We have now the whole development of the word 'consciousness' before us, and we see that in the end 'consciousness' necessarily comes to signify a particular individual which is sharply distinguished from thing-individual, and is usually called 'immaterial' in order to bring out this distinction. One must not, however, interpret this negative designation to imply anything more than a bare denial that consciousness is a thing-individual. One must not extract from it the notion

¹ §§ 11, 16, 17, 49.

of indestructibility on the ground that, since the material individual has come to be known as perishable, corporeality and destructibility form an intelligible unity, and accordingly that incorporeality and indestructibility are rationally connected. Whether the individual which is a consciousness is perishable or not, is a question in regard to which nothing can be inferred from the indubitable fact of immateriality.

But though immateriality does in no sense involve indestructibility as its consequence, we can nevertheless maintain that if the particular immaterial consciousness-individual is absent for a time, its reappearance in conjunction with the same body is possible, and under certain conditions will take place. Herein lies the difference between the immaterial consciousness, as individual, and the material thing. The latter requires that its particular abstract momentary unities form an *unbroken* series, so that when it is for the shortest period of time non-existent its being is for all time at an end. A consciousness, on the other hand, can cease to exist as a particular individual, and yet later be in existence again as the same concrete individual: a man, as we say, 'loses consciousness,' and 'comes to consciousness again.'

We must think this particular individual 'consciousness,' if we would take into account and render intelligible the incontestable fact that consciousness regarded as determination may in one and the same person appear, disappear, and later reappear. For, in the first place, we have shown that the determination consciousness as itself given is only possible as a universal determination of an individual which is wholly different from a material thing, and accordingly is itself called a consciousness; and, in the second place, as we have also proved, in every case a universal determination can only cease to be and later come into existence again, if the individual to which it belongs ceases to exist and again comes into being. The indisputable fact above referred to, therefore, forces us to the conception of a particular individual, consciousness, which appears and again reappears according as consciousness is present or absent. Accordingly temporal continuity, in its particular abstract

momentary unities, is not, as in the case of a 'thing,' an indispensable condition for the possibility of this concrete consciousness. The continuity based on memory takes the place of this temporal continuity.¹

I hold, therefore, that any one who proceeds from the fact of consciousness as a peculiar determination of the given as such necessarily arrives at the conclusion that man, who 'has consciousness,' as the saying is, is a peculiar conjunction of thing and consciousness-individual, *i.e.*, of body and soul. Whoever keeps the fact of consciousness constantly before him must reach the conception of an individual, consciousness, which is entirely different from body, the thing-individual. He must come to recognize that the individual which has consciousness *is* just consciousness, and can be nothing else; so that man, who unquestionably has a body along with consciousness, cannot himself be the consciousness-individual. When we say of man that he *has* consciousness, this is to be understood in the same way as we understand the statement that he has a body. The body is a particular individual, a thing which is a member of the peculiar conjunction which constitutes man; the other member is, like the body, a particular individual, namely, the concrete consciousness (soul), and it belongs to man as his body does.

Now this particular *individual, consciousness*, defines the *subject-matter of psychology*, since it is given in conjunction with the body and in continual interaction with it *as the human consciousness*, and we are entitled to leave the animal consciousness out of account. This subject-matter is, in the case of every man, — or to speak more correctly, every human consciousness, — given to himself directly and without any mediation. I have an immediate knowledge of myself, and I am a *particular* consciousness through the peculiar determination of myself as consciousness, namely, through the perceptions, ideas, and feelings, as well as wishes and volitions, which I, this determinate concrete consciousness, have and experience in manifold forms and combinations.

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¹ Cf. *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie*, § 17, pp. 121 ff.; §§ 45, 46.